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AN EXCLUSIVE RIGHT TO EVOKE
Stacey L. Dogan*
Abstract: Ten years ago, in White v. Samsung Electronics America, Inc., the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that a robot violated
Vanna White’s publicity rights. Since White, the tendency to equate
evocation with infringement in trademark and right of publicity cases
has only grown. In contrast to this expansionist trend in trademark and
right of publicity law, however, courts in recent copyright cases have
arguably backed away from a strong right to evoke. This Article
identiªes these trends and suggests some reasons for concern over an
exclusive right to evoke. The author argues that if we wish to preserve a
rich commons and avoid signiªcantly chilling free expression, courts
should at least cabin the right to evoke and ensure that, when utilized, it
serves the law’s normative goals.1

Introduction
evoke \i-’vOk\ . . . 1: to call forth or up: as . . . c: to bring to mind or
recollection....... 2

Ten years have passed since the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit, in White v. Samsung Electronics America, Inc.,3 held that a
robot violated Vanna White’s publicity rights.4 In White, the court held
* Associate Professor, Northeastern University School of Law. This Article was presented at the Boston College Law School Symposium on Intellectual Property, ECommerce and the Internet in October 2002. I appreciate helpful comments from the
participants, particularly Fred Yen, Joe Liu, Ruth Okediji, and Tony Reese.
1 As this Article was going to press, the United States Supreme Court decided Moseley v.
V Secret Catalogue, Inc., 123 S. Ct. 1115 (2003), rejecting a strong-form right to evoke under
trademark law. See infra notes 135–150 and accompanying text.
2 Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary 402 (10th ed. 1996).
3 971 F.2d 1395 (9th Cir. 1992).
4 See id. at 1399. The court was actually reversing a grant of summary judgment for the
defense, but it made its views of the merits clear. See id. Ultimately, a jury awarded White
$403,000 in damages. See Vanna White Wins Suit, Wall St. J., Jan. 24, 1994, at B2; see also
Wendt v. Host Int’l, Inc., Nos. 93-56318, 93-56510, 1995 WL 115571, at *1–2 (9th Cir. Mar.
16, 1995) (similarities between physical characteristics of robots and actors precluded
summary judgment for defendants in right of publicity claim).
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that the right of publicity extends beyond a celebrity’s name or likeness to cover virtually any symbol that might “evoke” a celebrity’s
identity for commercial gain.5 Judge Kozinski argued in his dissent
from a denial of rehearing en banc, “Instead of having an exclusive
right in her name, likeness, signature or voice, every famous person
now has an exclusive right to anything that reminds the viewer of her. After
all, that’s all Samsung did: It used an inanimate object to remind
people of White, to ‘evoke [her identity].’”6
Kozinski portrayed this so-called “right to evoke” as a radical departure from prior precedent,7 but in fact, intellectual property laws
had been used for some time to prevent the use of non-proprietary
symbols to evoke personal identities, trademarks, or creative works.
The right of publicity law was applied to look-alikes,8 sound-alikes,9
and a racecar that made people think of its driver;10 state trademark
5 See White, 971 F.2d at 1399 (A broad right of publicity is necessary because “[t]he
identities of the most popular celebrities are not only the most attractive for advertisers,
but also the easiest to evoke without resorting to obvious means such as name, likeness, or
voice.”).
6 White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., 989 F.2d 1512, 1515 (9th Cir. 1993) (Kozinski, J.,
dissenting) (denial of rehearing en banc).
7 See id. Kozinski had plenty of company in criticizing the outcome in White. See Arlen
W. Langvardt, The Troubling Implications of a Right of Publicity “Wheel” Spun Out of Control, 45
U. Kan. L. Rev. 329, 399 (1997) (contending that the Ninth Circuit decision created “a
property right of unprecedented and unwarranted scope”); David S. Welkowitz, Catching
Smoke, Nailing JELL-O to a Wall: The Vanna White Case and the Limits of Celebrity Rights, 3 J.
Intell. Prop. L. 67, 77–84 (1995); Linda J. Stack, Note, White v. Samsung Electronics
America, Inc.’s Expansion of the Right of Publicity: Enriching Celebrities at the Expense of Free
Speech, 89 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1189, 1194–97 (1995); Fred M. Weiler, Note, The Right of Publicity
Gone Wrong: A Case for Privileged Appropriation of Identity, 13 Cardozo Arts & Ent. L.J. 223,
258 (1994) (“in ªnding misappropriation under these circumstances, a court is empowering White to enjoin an advertiser from depicting anything next to the ‘Wheel of Fortune’
game board”).
8 See Allen v. Nat’l Video, Inc., 610 F. Supp. 612, 624 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
9 See Lombardo v. Doyle, Dane & Bernbach, 58 A.D.2d 620, 622 (N.Y. App. Div. 1977).
10 See Motschenbacher v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 498 F.2d 821, 827 (9th Cir. 1974)
(racecar driver has publicity claim against advertiser that used photo of car with unidentiªable man inside); see also Carson v. Here’s Johnny Portable Toilets, 698 F.2d 831, 836
(6th Cir. 1983) (“Here’s Johnny” mark found to violate Johnny Carson’s right of publicity);
Allen, 610 F. Supp. at 624.
[T]he question before the court is not whether some, or even most, people
will be reminded of plaintiff when they see this advertisement. In order to ªnd
that the photograph contains plaintiff’s ’portrait or picture,’ the court would
have to conclude that most persons who could identify an actual photograph
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dilution laws had been invoked against marks that resembled other
marks without causing confusion;11 and copyright law had been interpreted to protect the “total concept and feel” of creative works.12 Certainly, trademark and copyright law sometimes offered safe harbor if
the evocation was designed to parody or criticize the intellectual
property;13 but if the evocation was not so designed, courts frequently
granted relief based on a party’s use of material that did not consist
of, but somehow evoked, another’s original work, trademark, or celebrity image.14
After White, the tendency to equate evocation with infringement
in trademark and right of publicity cases only grew. After the passage
of the Federal Trademark Dilution Act of 1995 (“FTDA”), some courts
concluded that an owner of a famous mark could prevent others from
using marks that merely “conjure[d]” the famous mark,15 and actors
extended the right of publicity to devices that evoked characters that
of plaintiff would be likely to think that this was actually his picture. This
standard is necessary since we deal not with the question of whether an undisputed picture of plaintiff is recognizable to some, but whether an undisputed picture of defendant Boroff should be regarded, as a matter of law, to
be a portrait or picture of plaintiff.
Allen, 610 F. Supp. at 624; see also Lombardo, 58 A.D.2d at 622 (Guy Lombardo sued claiming that singing of Auld Lang Syne appropriated his identity. The court upheld on the
basis that people could be deceived into thinking he was in the commercial, even though
the actor in the commercial did not resemble Lombardo.); Paul J. Heald, Filling Two Gaps
in the Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition: Mixed-Use Trademarks and the Problem with
Vanna, 47 S.C. L. Rev. 783, 806 (1996) (contending that “Judge Kozinski’s dissent fails to
garner a majority of the Ninth Circuit judges because his assertion that a reference is not
an appropriation seems equally applicable to generally accepted precedent”).
11 See Toys “R” Us, Inc. v. Canarsie Kiddie Shop, Inc., 559 F. Supp. 1189, 1208 (E.D.N.Y.
1983) (allowing dilution claim against user of Kids “R” Us mark based on similarity to Toys
“R” Us sufªx).
12 See Sid & Marty Krofft Television Prods., Inc. v. McDonald’s Corp., 562 F.2d 1157,
1167 (9th Cir. 1977); Roth Greeting Cards v. United Card Co., 429 F.2d 1106, 1109–10 (9th
Cir. 1970).
13 See Fisher v. Dees, 794 F.2d 432, 435 (9th Cir. 1986) (copyright); Eveready Battery
Co., Inc. v. Adolph Coors Co., 765 F. Supp. 440, 450 (N.D. Ill. 1991) (trademark parody).
14 See Nabisco, Inc. v. PF Brands, Inc., 191 F.3d 208, 218 (2d Cir. 1999); Wendt v. Host
Int’l, Inc., 125 F.3d 806, 810 (9th Cir. 1997).
15 See V Secret Catalogue, Inc. v. Mosley, 259 F.3d 464, 471 n.3 (6th Cir. 2001) (rejecting suggestion that marks must be “substantially similar” for dilution to occur, and requiring only that junior mark conjure senior mark), rev’d, 123 S. Ct. 1115; Nabisco, 191 F.3d at
218 (“The marks must be of sufªcient similarity so that, in the mind of the consumer, the
junior mark will conjure an association with the senior.” (emphasis added)).
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the actors played on television.16 Courts reached these decisions with
little consideration of their impact on the cultural commons—i.e., on
the pool of communicative resources available for use by the public.17
In contrast to this expansionist trend in trademark and right of
publicity law, however, courts in recent copyright cases have arguably
backed away from a strong right to evoke. For example, the “look and
feel” doctrine, which initially threatened to fence off highly abstract
features of copyrighted works, has matured into a fairly narrow theory
of limited applicability.18 Just as signiªcantly, courts in copyright cases
have repeatedly invoked a series of limiting doctrines designed to preserve a rich public domain. The idea/expression dichotomy,19 the
scenes-a-faire doctrine,20 and the merger rule21 all enable courts to
carve out dimensions of creative works that should not be owned. Fair
use allows the copying of protected material if necessary to achieve a
laudable goal.22 By applying a robust version of these doctrines in
16 See Wendt, 125 F.3d at 810 (The validity of statutory right of publicity claims is determined by “[t]he degree to which these robots resemble, caricature, or bear an impressionistic resemblance to” plaintiffs.).
17 See id. at 811 (The court refused to balance actors’ publicity rights against the interest of the copyright holder in a television program: “While it is true that appellants’ fame
arose in large part through their participation in Cheers, an actor or actress does not lose
the right to control the commercial exploitation of his or her likeness by portraying a ªctional character.”); White, 971 F.2d at 1398 (limiting inquiry in right of publicity cases to
whether defendant “appropriated” plaintiff’s identity by any means, including by evocation).
18 See, e.g., Apple Computer, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 35 F.3d 1435, 1443 (9th Cir. 1994)
(establishing narrow scope of protection for cases relying exclusively on similarity in overall concept and feel); cf. Cavalier v. Random House, Inc., 297 F.3d 815, 822–25 (9th Cir.
2001) (holding that to bring a case to the fact-ªnder based on similarities in a work’s “total
concept and feel,” a plaintiff must ªrst establish substantial similarity in protected aspects of
work under the Ninth Circuit’s so-called “extrinsic” test).
19 See Williams v. Crichton, 84 F.3d 581, 587–89 (2d Cir. 1996) (ªnding no infringement when the primary similarity between works lay in the same “idea” of a story set in a
dinosaur theme park).
20 See id. (The court found no substantial similarity between the settings of two works
about dinosaur theme parks: although the two works “share a setting of a dinosaur zoo or
adventure park, with electriªed fences, automated tours, dinosaur nurseries, and uniformed workers, these settings are classic scenes a faire that ºow from the uncopyrightable
concept of a dinosaur zoo.”).
21 See Yankee Candle Co., Inc. v. Bridgewater Candle Co., 259 F.3d 25, 36 (1st Cir.
2001) (applying merger doctrine to ªnd no infringement unless candle labels are “nearly
identical” with one another).
22 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2000).
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look-and-feel cases, most courts have resisted a strong right to evoke
in copyright law.
The absence of such muscular limits in trademark and right of
publicity law has fostered the growth of a right to evoke, to the clear
detriment of the public. As intellectual property laws extend beyond
the protection of particular, identiªable elements and into the more
metaphysical realm, they threaten to overprotect in ways that stiºe
speech.23 In addition, as parties succeed in enjoining behavior based
on the use of non-proprietary signals that make people think of them,
they risk chilling not only those who wish to appropriate their work or
to trade on their reputation, but also those whose evocation is purely
referential or even unknowing.24 An exclusive right to evoke therefore
should concern us.
This Article seeks to call attention to the right to evoke and to
identify the costs associated with its expansion. “Right to evoke,” as
used in this Article, means a right to prevent others from calling to
mind a particular piece of intellectual property even if they have not
replicated the intellectual property or deceived the public in any way.
The critique therefore targets evocation as a right in and of itself, and
not as a piece of evidence to be considered in an infringement suit.
Thus, one work’s evocation of another is certainly relevant to proof of
substantial similarity in a copyright case,25 but it does not alone establish that a defendant has wrongfully appropriated copyrighted expression.26 Likewise, to dilute a famous mark, a trademark should come
closer than merely calling the mark to mind,27 and evocation of a per-

23 See generally Alfred C. Yen, A First Amendment Perspective on the Idea/Expression Dichotomy
and Copyright in a Work’s “Total Concept and Feel,” 38 Emory L.J. 393, 426–27 (1989) (discussing risk of chill from look-and-feel doctrine).
24 See White, 989 F.2d at 1513.
25 See Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464, 468 (2d Cir. 1946) (articulating two-step test for
infringement, requiring proof of copying and substantial similarity).
26 See id. at 472–73 (discussing requirement to prove “illicit” or “improper” copying of
copyrighted expression in infringement suit); see also Warner Bros. Inc. v. Am. Broad. Cos.,
720 F.2d 231, 242 (2d Cir. 1983) (“Stirring one’s memory of a copyrighted character is not
the same as appearing to be substantially similar to that character, and only the latter is
infringement.”).
27 See V Secret Catalogue, 259 F.3d at 471 n.3, rev’d, 123 S. Ct. 1115.
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son’s identity should be a necessary, but not sufªcient, prerequisite to
a right of publicity claim.28
To be sure, courts have recognized the public’s afªrmative right
to evoke trademarks or personal identities in certain circumstances.
So, for example, individuals may not only evoke, but also use trademarks for parody29 or criticism;30 parties may employ others’ trademarks for comparative advertising or other “fair” uses;31 and reporters
may evoke individuals’ identities for news reporting without violating
their right of publicity.32 Each of these cases, however, involves defendants who, for one reason or another, warrant special license to engage in behavior that would otherwise infringe. My point here is that
by allowing evocation to serve as a proxy for infringement of trade28 See Carson, 698 F.2d at 835 (“The right of publicity, as we have stated, is that a celebrity has a protected pecuniary interest in the commercial exploitation of his identity.”).
29 See Mattel, Inc. v. MCA Records, Inc., 296 F.3d 894, 907 (9th Cir. 2002), cert. denied,
No. 02-633, 2003 WL 167680 (U.S. Jan. 27, 2003) (parody of a trademark falls within noncommercial use exemption); Lucasªlm Ltd. v. Media Mkt. Group, Ltd., 182 F. Supp. 2d
897, 900 (N.D. Cal. 2002) (“[p]arody is a form of non-commercial, protected speech which
is not affected by the Federal Trademark Dilution Act”). Some, but not all, jurisdictions
have held that the First Amendment requires some protection for parody in right of publicity cases as well. Compare Cardtoons, L.C. v. Major League Baseball Players Ass’n, 95 F.3d
959, 973–76 (10th Cir. 1996) (parody trading cards protected under First Amendment
against players’ right of publicity claim), and Comedy III Prods., Inc. v. Gary Saderup, Inc.,
21 P.3d 797, 810 (Cal. 2001), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1078 (2002) (“[W]hen an artist is faced
with a right of publicity challenge to his or her work, he or she may raise as afªrmative
defense that the work is protected by the First Amendment inasmuch as it contains
signiªcant transformative elements or that the value of the work does not derive primarily
from the celebrity’s fame.”), with White, 971 F.2d at 1401 (no parody defense to right of
publicity claim when the “ad’s spoof of Vanna White and Wheel of Fortune is subservient
and only tangentially related to the ad’s primary message: ‘buy Samsung VCRs’”).
30 See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a), (c) (2000) (unfair competition and dilution claims both require “commercial” use of trademark); see also CPC Int’l, Inc. v. Skippy Inc., 214 F.3d 456,
462 (4th Cir. 2000) (undue expansion of trademark laws to control language would “diminish our ability to discuss the products or criticize the conduct of companies that may
be of widespread public concern and importance”) (citing Mark A. Lemley, The Modern
Lanham Act and the Death of Common Sense, 108 Yale L.J. 1687, 1710–11 (1999)).
31 See New Kids on the Block v. News Am. Publ’g, Inc., 971 F.2d 302, 307–08 (9th Cir.
1992) (establishing “nominative fair use” defense in trademark law); SSP Agric. Equip.,
Inc. v. Orchard-Rite Ltd., 592 F.2d 1096, 1103 (9th Cir. 1979) (“use of competitor’s trademark for purposes of comparative advertising is not trademark infringement ‘so long as it
does not contain misrepresentations or create a reasonable likelihood that purchasers will
be confused . . . .’”).
32 See Montana v. San Jose Mercury News, Inc., 34 Cal. App. 4th 790, 794 (1995);
Stephano v. News Group Pubs., Inc., 485 N.Y.S.2d 220, 225–26 (1984).
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mark and publicity rights, courts risk unduly broadening the kinds of
behavior that one needs a license to commit.
Judging from a recent decision of the United States Supreme
Court, the tide of trademark law may well be turning away from a
strong-form right to evoke. As this Article was going to press, the
Court, in Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, Inc., announced that “the mere
fact that consumers mentally associate [a] junior user’s mark with a
famous mark is not sufªcient to establish actionable dilution.”33 If
lower courts follow the Supreme Court’s cue in Moseley, trademark law
may follow copyright in limiting the legal consequences of evocation.
Because Moseley rested on an interpretation of the FTDA, however, it
reserved no afªrmative evocation right to the public, and has no impact on state dilution law or the right of publicity.34
Part I describes the evolution of the right to evoke in copyright,
right of publicity, and trademark law.35 It begins with copyright, in
which courts initially ºirted with a right to evoke, but later backed off
by applying a series of doctrines designed to make copyright true to
its normative goals.36 After describing this progression, Part I turns to
right of publicity and trademark, in which a right to evoke has been
alive and growing.37 Part II outlines the dangers of a right to evoke—
including its overbreadth and the risk that it will chill legitimate behavior—and contends that the public has an afªrmative interest in
evoking cultural reference points in our society.38 Part III suggests a
number of vehicles through which courts might accommodate these
interests in trademark and right of publicity cases.39
Two caveats are in order here. First, this Article is preliminary
and exploratory. I do not pretend to catalog every case recognizing a
right to evoke, nor do I discuss all of the threats presented by such
recognition. My goals are more modest—to raise consciousness of the
existence of a trend and to warn of its dangers. Second, despite my
concerns about a right to evoke, my opposition is not absolute; I can
33 123 S. Ct. at 1124.
34 See id.
35 See infra notes 40–150 and accompanying text.
36 See infra notes 48–78 and accompanying text.
37 See infra notes 79–150 and accompanying text.
38 See infra notes 151–165 and accompanying text.
39 See infra notes 165–171 and accompanying text.
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imagine circumstances in which an evocation might offend the interests that our intellectual property laws are designed to promote. Such
cases, however, will be rare, and courts must do a better job of guarding against the other, far more common, cases in which the public
interest in evocation outweighs the interests of intellectual property
holders in the protected aspects of their “property.”
I. Evocation as Right
“Right to evoke” is not a term used by courts in intellectual property cases. Instead, courts describe copyright infringement in terms of
the rights granted by section 106 of the Copyright Act,40 depict
trademark entitlements as non-exclusive rights to prevent confusion
and/or dilution of protected marks,41 and say that the state-law right
of publicity applies only if a defendant has appropriated an individual’s identity for commercial gain.42
Yet as intellectual property doctrine has evolved, courts have increasingly loosened the strictures of what it means to copy, to confuse,
and to appropriate.43 I am not the ªrst to observe this phenomenon;
countless scholars have traced the expansionist trends of copyright,44
trademark,45 and right of publicity46 doctrine. This Part critiques a
40 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2000).
41 See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1114(1), 1125(a), (c) (2000).
42 See Cardtoons, L.C. v. Major League Baseball Players Ass’n, 95 F.3d 959, 967–68
(10th Cir. 1996). The speciªc elements of a right of publicity claim vary among jurisdictions, but most jurisdictions that recognize the right have adopted this standard. See id.
“Most formulations of the right protect against the unauthorized use of certain features of
a person’s identity—such as name, likeness, or voice—for commercial purposes.” Id. (citing J. Thomas McCarthy, The Rights of Publicity and Privacy §§ 4.9–.15 (1996)).
43 In many cases, the legislature has either led the way or has codiªed the expansion
retroactively. The federal dilution right arose as a creature of statutory law. See 15 U.S.C.
§ 1125(c). Also, in the 1976 overhaul of the Copyright Act, Congress for the ªrst time gave
copyright holders a statutory exclusive right to make derivative works based on their copyrighted work. See 17 U.S.C. § 106(2).
44 See Neil Weinstock Netanel, Locating Copyright Within the First Amendment Skein, 54
Stan. L. Rev. 1 (2001); Yen, supra note 23, at 393.
45 Seminal examples include Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Expressive Genericity: Trademarks
as Language in the Pepsi Generation, 65 Notre Dame L. Rev. 397 (1990); Lemley, supra note
30; and Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., Trademark Monopolies, 48 Emory L.J. 367 (1999).
46 E.g., Michael Madow, Private Ownership of Public Image: Popular Culture and Publicity
Rights, 81 Cal. L. Rev. 125, 178–238 (1993) (critiquing each of the theoretical justiªcations
offered for right of publicity law).
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particular piece of that expansion: the use of evocation as a proxy for
proof of violation of a right under copyright, right of publicity, or
trademark law.47
A. Copyright
Historically, copyright law did not support claims based on mere
evocation.48 The standard for infringement—which required both
copying and substantial similarity—seemed to contemplate claims
only against parties that replicated identiªable, tangible, and protectable features of copyrighted works.49 Although the law protected
against the copying of non-literal expression (such as characters and
plot structures),50 plaintiffs were required to identify with precision
the high-level expression that the defendant appropriated.51 A plaintiff claiming substantial similarity in plot structure, for example, had
to convince a fact-ªnder that the defendant’s plot replicated the
original components of the plaintiff’s own narrative ºow.52
Beginning in the late 1970s, however, a series of cases began
eroding the traditional requirement of a particularized showing of
similarities between works. In the ªrst such case, the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, in Sid & Marty Krofft Television Productions, Inc. v. McDonald’s Corp.,53 held that a plaintiff could prove infringement based solely on similarities in the “total concept and feel”
of two works, even if the expressive details were quite different. Krofft
itself involved a claim of infringement of the look and feel of a chil47 See, e.g., Lunney, supra note 45, at 372 (describing “‘property mania’—the belief that
expanded trademark protection was necessarily desirable so long as the result could be
characterized as ‘property’”).
48 See Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464, 468–69 (2d Cir. 1946).
49 See id.
50 See Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119, 121 (2d Cir. 1930) (“It is of
course essential to any protection of literary property, whether at common-law or under
the statute, that the right cannot be limited literally to the text, else a plagiarist would escape by immaterial variations.”).
51 See id. at 122–23. In Nichols, for example, the plaintiff claimed that the defendant
had appropriated the characters and plot structure of her play. See id. at 120. Judge Hand
found no infringement, however, because the similarities lay in stock characters and the
highly general “ideas” underlying the play. See id. at 122–23.
52 See id.
53 See generally 562 F.2d 1157 (9th Cir. 1977).
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dren’s television show.54 The two-step test that the court adopted55
virtually invited fact-ªnders to ªnd infringement based on evocation.56
A decade later, the Ninth Circuit, in Roth Greeting Cards v. United
Card Co.,57 re-endorsed “total concept and feel” protection in a case
involving the “mood” of a series of greeting cards.58 The defendant in
the case had used its own artwork on its cards, and had copied text
too inconsequential to merit copyright protection.59 All of the particularized expression in the two lines of cards was thus either unprotected or not copied.60 The court nonetheless found infringement
because “the characters depicted in the art work, the mood they portrayed, the combination of art work conveying a particular mood with
a particular message, and the arrangement of the words on the greeting card are substantially the same . . . .”61
Like Krofft, Roth essentially recognized an exclusive right to evoke
in copyright law.62 Under the “total concept and feel” doctrine as
originally conceived, a party could prevail in a copyright case without
identifying any protected similarities between a copyrighted and an infringing work; a plaintiff only needed to convince a fact-ªnder that
the works exuded a similar mood.63

54 Id. at 1167.
55 See id. In the ªrst, “extrinsic” step, the court required a plaintiff to prove similarities
in the ideas of the two works; in the second, “intrinsic” step, the court asked whether the
target audience would view the overall feel of the works as substantially similar. See id.; see
also Roth Greeting Cards v. United Card Co., 429 F.2d 1106, 1110 (9th Cir. 1987). But see
Yen, supra note 23, at 410–11 (Yen criticizes Roth and Krofft for allowing abstract similarities
between two works to support claim of copyright infringement: “Roth and Krofft strongly
suggest that the very mood a work creates constitutes its protectable expression. If copyright claims can in fact be maintained at such a high level of abstraction, practically any
similarity could conceivably support a ªnding of infringement.”).
56 This was especially true in Krofft, because the court made clear that the fact-ªnder
should attempt to anticipate the reaction of the target audience—young children. See 562
F.2d at 1166.
57 429 F.2d at 1106.
58 See id. at 1110.
59 See id. at 1109–10.
60 See id.
61 Id. at 1110.
62 See Roth, 429 F.2d at 1110.
63 See id.
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To some extent, this exclusive right to evoke in copyright law
arose because of the difªculty in articulating exactly what copyright
law protected, and why. The United States Supreme Court has stated
repeatedly that copyright in the United States exists for utilitarian
purposes—”to stimulate artistic creativity for the general public
good.”64 Thus, copyright extends only to “intellectual conceptions of
the author,”65 and protects only against the copying of the author’s
contributions.66 Yet deciding what kinds of original contributions
merit protection had long ºummoxed the courts.67 Learned Hand’s
classic formulation of copyright’s scope—that it extends to expression, but not ideas68—only begged the question of how to draw a dis-

64 See Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975); see also
Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 546 (1985) (“The rights
conferred by copyright are designed to assure contributors to the store of knowledge a fair
return for their labors.”); Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417,
429 (1984) (Copyright “is intended to motivate the creative activity of authors and inventors by the provision of a special reward, and to allow the public access to the products of
their genius after the limited period of exclusive control has expired.”). The utilitarian
framework derives ultimately from the Constitution. U.S. Const., art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (“The
Congress shall have Power . . . to Promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective
Writings and Discoveries.”).
Scholars have asserted other philosophical defenses of copyright. See Wendy J.
Gordon, A Property Right in Self-Expression: Equality and Individualism in the Natural Law of
Intellectual Property, 102 Yale L.J. 1533, 1540–78 (1993) (suggesting a Lockean justiªcation
for copyright); Joseph P. Liu, Owning Digital Copies: Copyright Law and the Incidents of Copy
Ownership, 42 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 1245, 1296–1300 (2001) (discussing competing theories
for copyright and concluding that “[i]n practice, courts draw upon an uneasy and sometimes conºicting mix of different theoretical frameworks”); Alfred C. Yen, Restoring the
Natural Law: Copyright as Labor and Possession, 51 Ohio St. L.J. 517, 524–29 (1990) (identifying natural law origins in United States copyright law). The United States Supreme
Court, however, has at least nominally adhered to the utilitarian or instrumentalist approach. See Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 546; Sony, 464 U.S. at 429.
65 Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53, 58 (1884); cf. Feist Pubs., Inc.
v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 347–48 (1991) (“even a directory that contains absolutely no protectible written expression, only facts, meets the constitutional minimum for
copyright protection if it features an original selection or arrangement”).
66 See Feist, 499 U.S. at 348 (“Originality remains the sine qua non of copyright; accordingly, copyright protection may extend only to those components of a work that are original to the author.”).
67 See Nichols, 45 F.2d at 121.
68 See id.
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tinction between the two.69 In the absence of any clear guidance, the
early look-and-feel courts concluded that the fairly abstract “feel” or
“mood” of a work could constitute protected expression.70
A number of recent developments, however, have suggested a
greater willingness of courts to interpret “expression” more strictly
and thereby to swing the pendulum away from a right to evoke in
copyright law. Perhaps stimulated by the Supreme Court’s decision in
Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Co.,71 holding that actionable copying requires “copying of constituent elements of the work
that are original,” lower courts have used greater rigor in evaluating
look-and-feel infringement claims.72 The Ninth Circuit, in particular,
has modiªed the intrinsic/extrinsic approach laid out in Krofft to require an initial showing of similarities between expressive elements of
two works before a case can reach the jury.73 In addition, if a plaintiff
rests a claim only on similarities in the combination of otherwise unprotectable features, the Ninth Circuit has required “virtual identity”

69 See id. Hand acknowledged the difªculty, stating, “Nobody has ever been able to ªx
that boundary, and nobody ever can.” Id. Many contemporary scholars have questioned
the very pursuit of a dichotomy between idea and expression. See Yen, supra note 23, at 405
(“[T]he quest for separation of idea and expression” set forth in the seminal case to make
the distinction is “based primarily on instinct, and not upon some principled distinction
between the two categories . . . . [T]he Nichols opinion never stated any principle which
tells the court where to draw the line between idea and expression.”); see also Peter Pan
Fabrics, Inc. v. Martin Weiner Corp., 274 F.2d 487, 489 (2d Cir. 1960) (“Obviously, no principle can be stated as to when an imitator has gone beyond copying the ‘idea,’ and has
borrowed its ‘expression,’” so the distinction must “inevitably be ad hoc.”).
70 See Roth, 429 F.2d at 1110.
71 499 U.S. at 340.
72 Id. at 361 (emphasis added).
73 See Cavalier v. Random House, Inc., 297 F.3d 815, 822–23 (9th Cir. 2002) (“when applying the extrinsic test, a court must ªlter out and disregard the non-protectible elements
in making its substantial similarity determination”); see also Apple Computer, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 35 F.3d 1435, 1443 (9th Cir. 1994) (“Because only those elements of a work that
are protectable and used without the author’s permission can be compared when it comes
to the ultimate question of illicit copying, we use analytic dissection to determine the
scope of copyright protection before works are considered ‘as a whole.’”); Shaw v. Lindheim, 919 F.2d 1353, 1361 (9th Cir. 1990) (“If a district court concludes, after analyzing
the objective criteria under the extrinsic test, that reasonable minds might differ as to
whether there is substantial similarity between the protected expression of ideas in two literary
works, and the record supports the district court’s conclusion, there is a triable issue of fact
that precludes summary judgment.”) (emphasis added).
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in selection and arrangement.74 Other jurisdictions have similarly insisted that plaintiffs identify with particularity similarities in the original and allegedly infringing works, even in cases involving look-andfeel claims.75
Complementing this stricter conception of “expression,” courts
have relied upon copyright’s limiting doctrines to narrow the scope of
look-and-feel claims. They have used merger,76 scenes-a-faire,77 and
the originality requirement78 to ªlter out unprotected aspects of
works in look-and-feel cases. The cumulative effect of these doctrines
is that a plaintiff in a copyright case must persuade a court not merely
that the defendant has done something to remind the public of the
plaintiff’s work, but that the defendant has actually copied an
identiªable component of the plaintiff’s original expression.

74 Apple, 35 F.3d at 1446; see also Feist, 499 U.S. at 349 (describing copyright in factual
compilations as “thin”).
75 See Williams v. Chrichton, 84 F.3d 581, 588 (2d Cir. 1996). “When we determine that
a work contains both protectible and unprotectible elements, we must take care to inquire
only whether ‘the protectible elements, standing alone, are substantially similar.’” (quoting
Knitwaves, Inc. v. Lollytogs Ltd., 71 F.3d 996, 1002 (2d Cir. 1995)); see also Le Moine v.
Combined Communications Corp., No. 95C5881, 1996 WL 332688, at *6 (N.D. Ill. June
13, 1996) (ªnding no infringement when, “although the two works may appear to have a
similar total concept and feel when viewed superªcially, the similar appearance of the two
works stems only from the [unprotected] individual elements they share, not from a substantially similar total concept and feel arising from the creative arrangement and interaction of common elements.”); cf. Sturdza v. United Arab Emirates, 281 F.3d 1287, 1297–99
(D.C. Cir. 2002) (ªnding, after detailed comparison of two architectural works, including
particular combinations of unprotected elements, enough evidence of similarity in “look
and feel” to survive summary judgment).
76 The merger doctrine denies copyright protection to expression that constitutes one
of a few ways of describing an unprotected idea. See Yankee Candle Co., Inc. v. Bridgewater
Candle Co., 259 F.3d 25, 35 (1st Cir. 2001) (applying merger doctrine to deny protection
to candle labels and therefore to reject look-and-feel claim).
77 See Williams, 84 F.3d at 588.
78 E.g., Tufenkian Imp./Exp. Ventures, Inc. v. Einstein Moomjy, Inc., 237 F. Supp. 2d
376, 386–89 (S.D.N.Y. 2002).
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B. Right of Publicity
The right of publicity79 is, at core, a business right to control use
of one’s identity in commerce.80 Although courts and commentators
have offered various rationales for the right, most modern cases defend it on some combination of incentive, just deserts, and unjust enrichment grounds: celebrities should have an incentive to develop
valuable public personas, their efforts should be rewarded, and others
deriving ªnancial beneªts from those valuable identities should pay.81
Publicity claims arise most often in celebrity endorsement cases, but
the right extends to any use of a celebrity image calling attention to
commercial interests or products.82 The publicity right originally applied only to the use of a celebrity’s name or photograph; over time,
however, courts extended it to the use of a celebrity’s “identity,”83 reasoning that to limit the right to the use of particular features of the
celebrity would defeat the objective of giving celebrities “a protected

79 Not all states have endorsed a right of publicity, and those that have vary somewhat
in form and substance. See McCarthy, supra note 42, §§ 1.1–.11 (discussing the development of right of publicity laws and noting slow and inconsistent change); see also Michael J.
Albano, Note, Nothing to “Cheer” About: A Call for Reform of the Right of Publicity in Audiovisual
Characters, 90 Geo. L.J. 253, 265–86 (2001) (summarizing differences among state laws).
80 See McCarthy, supra note 42, §§ 6.3, 6.5–.6. The right emanated originally from the
common-law right to privacy. See Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 Harv. L. Rev. 193, 213–20 (1890). In the middle of the last century, however, courts
decided that the general right of individuals to be left alone was not well suited to remedying uses of celebrity identities (because the celebrities had deliberately cast themselves into
the limelight) and accordingly developed the modern right of publicity. See Haelan Labs.,
Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., 202 F.2d 866, 868 (2d Cir. 1953) (holding that “in addition to and independent of . . . right of privacy . . . , a man has a right in the publicity value
of his photograph”); see also Melville Nimmer, The Right of Publicity, 19 Law & Contemp.
Probs. 203, 215–23 (1954) (advocating publicity rights).
81 See Madow, supra note 46, at 178–238 (explaining various theoretical justiªcations
for right of publicity).
82 See Cardtoons, 95 F.3d at 968 (Under Oklahoma law, the right of publicity “requires
proof of three elements: (1) knowing use of [the celebrity’s] name[] or likeness[] (2) on
products, merchandise, or goods (3) without [the celebrity’s] prior consent.”); McFarland
v. Miller, 14 F.3d 912, 919 (3d Cir. 1994) (“A famous individual’s name, likeness, and endorsement carry value and an unauthorized use harms the person both by diluting the
value of the name and depriving that individual of compensation.”).
83 See Landham v. Lewis Galoob Toys Inc., 227 F.3d 619, 624–25 (6th Cir. 2000).
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pecuniary interest in the commercial exploitation of [their] identit[ies].”84
Even before White v. Samsung Electronics America, Inc., courts found
that use of symbols, phrases, look-alikes, or other devices to evoke the
image of a celebrity in advertisements violated the right of publicity.
Motschenbacher v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co.,85 for example, involved a
claim by a racecar driver who objected to an advertisement that featured a car with markings similar to his, along with an indistinct image of a driver.86 The Ninth Circuit in Motschenbacher held that, even
though “the ‘likeness’ of plaintiff is itself unrecognizable,” a publicity
claim could proceed because the car’s “markings were not only peculiar to the plaintiff’s cars but they caused some persons to think the
car in question was plaintiff’s and to infer that the person driving the
car was the plaintiff.”87 The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, in Carson v. Here’s Johnny Portable Toilets, Inc.,88 found Johnny Carson’s right of publicity violated by a portable-toilet company operating
under the name “Here’s Johnny.”89 And the New York Appellate
Court, in Lombardo v. Doyle, Dane & Bernbach, Inc.,90 held that a “combination of New Year’s Eve, balloons, party hats, and ‘Auld Lang Syne’
. . . might amount to an appropriation of [Guy Lombardo’s] carefully
and painstakingly built personality.”91 Over time, the courts appeared
84 Carson v. Here’s Johnny Portable Toilets, Inc., 698 F.2d 831, 835 (6th Cir. 1983) (“If
the celebrity’s identity is commercially exploited, there has been an invasion of his right
whether or not his ‘name or likeness’ is used.”).
85 498 F.2d 821 (9th Cir. 1974).
86 See id. at 822.
87 Id. at 827.
88 698 F.2d at 831.
89 Id. at 836. The dissent, like Judge Kozinski’s in White v. Samsung Electronics America,
contended that First Amendment principles should limit the scope of the publicity right.
Id. at 840 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
90 58 A.D.2d 620 (N.Y. App. Div. 1977).
91 Id. at 622; see also Waits v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 978 F.2d 1093, 1101–02 (9th Cir. 1992)
(sound-alike of Tom Waits in Frito-Lay commercial violated Waits’s right of publicity); Midler v. Ford Motor Co., 849 F.2d 460, 463–64 (9th Cir. 1988) (sound-alike commercial violated Bette Midler’s right of publicity); Lombardo, 58 A.D.2d at 623 (Titonne, J., dissenting)
(contending that Lombardo also stated a cause of action for invasion of privacy under New
York law, based on use in advertising of band and conductor using “the same gestures,
musical beat and choice of music (i.e., ‘Auld Lang Syne’) with which plaintiff had been
associated in the public’s mind for more than a decade”).
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to be converging on a simple rule: if a commercial actor ran an advertisement that obtained value by referencing a celebrity, that commercial actor should pay.92
White, therefore, involved not so much a departure as a fortiªcation and detailed articulation of a trend that had begun twenty years
before. The facts of the case are well known. Samsung, the electronics
manufacturer, had run a series of futuristic ads intended to show how
its products would fare over time in comparison to various pop culture references.93 One of the ads, for Samsung VCRs, showed a robot,
“dressed in a wig, gown, and jewelry,” standing “next to a game board
which is instantly recognizable as the Wheel of Fortune game show
set, in a stance for which Vanna White is famous.”94 A caption read,
“Longest-running game show. 2012 A.D.”95 Vanna White sued, claiming that the ad violated her publicity rights.96 The district court
granted summary judgment for Samsung, but the Ninth Circuit reversed.
The Ninth Circuit agreed that Samsung did not make use of
White’s name or likeness, but it nonetheless held that White had alleged facts sufªcient to support a publicity claim.97 True, the robot

92 See Kristine M. Boylan, The Corporate Right of Publicity in Federal Dilution Legislation,
Part II, 82 J. Pat. & Trademark Soc. 5, 27–32 (2000) (identifying sweat equity justiªcations for right of publicity law, and contending that similar arguments support a dilution
cause of action); Harry Kalven, Jr., Privacy In Tort Law—Were Warren and Brandeis Wrong?,
31 Law & Contemp. Probs. 326, 331 (1966) (“No social purpose is served by having the
defendant get for free some aspect of the plaintiff that would have market value and for
which he would normally pay.”).
93 See White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., 971 F.2d 1395, 1396 (9th Cir. 1992). One ad
showed a juicy steak with the caption, “Revealed to be health food, 2010 A.D.,” and another showed Morton Downey, Jr. as a presidential candidate in 2008. Id.
94 Id.
95 Id.
96 Id. at 1397. White’s claim under the federal Lanham Act was also reinstated by the
Ninth Circuit. Id. at 1399–1400.
97 See id. at 1397. This ªnding disposed of White’s statutory right of publicity claim,
which required proof of knowing use of her name or likeness for advertising or selling
purposes. See id. Citing California case law, Samsung argued that the common-law right of
publicity contained a similar requirement, but the Ninth Circuit disagreed. Because the
case cited by Samsung had involved use of actual photographs of the celebrity at issue, the
court reasoned, it
had no occasion to consider the extent beyond the use of name or likeness to
which the right of publicity reaches. The court held only that the right of
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did not replicate any of White’s features or use her name or voice;
nonetheless, the court announced, “[t]he right of publicity does not
require that appropriations of identity be accomplished through particular means to be actionable.”98 Indeed, by limiting the right to particular types of appropriation, “we would not only weaken the right
but effectively eviscerate it” because “[t]he identities of the most
popular celebrities are not only the most attractive for advertisers, but
also the easiest to evoke without resorting to obvious means such as
name, likeness, or voice.”99 By evoking White’s image, the court held,
Samsung had exploited the value of White’s celebrity, and therefore it
should pay.100
Despite two hefty dissents101 and rancorous scholarly criticism,102
White remains the law, at least in the Ninth Circuit. Although other
courts have discredited or distinguished certain aspects of the Ninth
Circuit’s reasoning in White,103 none has entirely abandoned the notion that a celebrity has a claim whenever an advertiser gets commercial value from evoking the celebrity’s persona. For example, the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, in Landham v. Lewis Galoob Toys,
Inc.,104 considered a movie actor’s claim that a toy based on his movie
character violated his right of publicity.105 The court announced that
the right of publicity “is now generally understood to cover anything
publicity cause of action ‘may be’ pleaded by alleging, inter alia, appropriation
of name or likeness, not that the action may be pleaded in only those terms.
Id.
98 White, 971 F.2d at 1398.
99 Id. at 1399 (emphasis added).
100 See id.
101 See id. at 1402 (Alarcon, J., dissenting) ( Judge Alarcon dissented to most of the
original opinion); see also White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., 989 F.2d 1512, 1521 (9th Cir.
1993) (Kozinski, J., with O’Scannlain, J. and Kleinfeld, J., dissenting) (denial of rehearing
en banc).
102 See Heald, supra note 10, at 804–07; Langvardt, supra note 7, at 399; Welkowitz, supra note 7, at 77–84; Stack, supra note 7, at 1194–97; Weiler, supra note 7, at 258; Peter K.
Yu, Note, Fictional Persona Test: Copyright Preemption in Human Audiovisual Characters, 20
Cardozo L. Rev. 355, 359–67 (1998).
103 See Cardtoons, 95 F.3d at 970 (rejecting the majority’s conclusion in White that the
First Amendment cannot insulate a celebrity parody against a right of publicity claim);
Landham v. Lewis Galoob Toys, Inc., 227 F.3d 619, 626 (6th Cir. 2000) (criticizing broadest
interpretation of White).
104 227 F.3d at 619.
105 See id. at 624.
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that suggests the plaintiff’s personal identity,”106 but held that in that
case the actor’s identity was not suggested because the public did not
associate him with his character.107 Had the public made such an association, the plaintiff would presumably have had a publicity claim.108
As it stands, then, the right of publicity extends to any commercial, unauthorized use of a device or symbol—including but not limited to the individual’s name, likeness, or voice—that brings to mind a
celebrity.109 Although theoretically the use must also commercially
beneªt the defendant, courts generally assume that if the celebrity
link is made, such a beneªt exists.110 The defendant need not use any
particular attribute of the celebrity or deceive the public into thinking
that it has.111 Evocation, alone, is enough.112
106 Id.
107 See id. at 626 (“we share . . . Judge Kozinski’s unwillingness to give every individual
who appears before a television or movie camera, by occupation or happenstance, the
right as a matter of law to compensation for every subtle nuance that may be taken by
someone as invoking his identity without ªrst being required to prove signiªcant commercial value and identiªability”).
108 See Wendt v. Host Int’l, Inc., 125 F.3d 806 (9th Cir. 1997). In Wendt, two of the actors
in the television program Cheers sued to prevent licensed, Cheers look-alike bars from using
barstool-sitting robots that allegedly resembled them. The district court granted summary
judgment because the robots bore no resemblance to the actors “except that one of the
robots, like one of the plaintiffs, is heavier than the other.” Id. at 809 (quoting district
court). The Ninth Circuit reversed summary judgment for defendants, holding that a jury
could conclude that the robots constituted likenesses of the actors that would justify a right
of publicity claim. See id. at 810–11. The court also found the claims not preempted by
copyright law. See id. at 809.
109 See McCarthy, supra note 42, § 3.2.
110 In White, for example, the Ninth Circuit simply assumed that Samsung was using
White’s identity to its commercial advantage. See 971 F.2d at 1399. Paul Heald has suggested the commercial beneªt requirement as one way to distinguish White from earlier
precedent and to support the argument that it represents a break from prior law:
The invocation of Vanna was not made to convince Vanna fans to buy the
product, but rather to convey in especially vivid fashion the abstract concept
of durability. This use of the celebrity persona to convey a concept is
signiªcantly different from those presented in Midler and Motschenbacher,
where the advertisers were attempting to capitalize on the intrinsic attractiveness of the unique attributes of a particular celebrity.
Heald, supra note 10, at 807. Heald proposes, “Only ‘if the name or likeness is used [primarily] to attract attention to a work [or product]’ should liability follow.” Id. at 809 (quoting Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition § 47 cmt. c (1993) (alteration in
original)).
111 Cf. Midler, 849 F.2d at 463–64 (voice imitation violated right of publicity).

2003]

An Exclusive Right to Evoke

309

C. Trademark
For most of its history, federal trademark law protected only
against misleading or deceptive uses of confusingly similar marks.113 It
was well accepted that a trademark holder had no rights against parties whose marks merely evoked the protected mark.114 Indeed, at
least with respect to trade dress, some courts viewed it as desirable to
allow competitors to use enough of the trade dress to evoke a competing product, as long as the overall appearance of the product did not
create confusion.115
The FTDA shifted this landscape. Intended to protect “famous
marks” against loss of their distinctiveness,116 the FTDA created a new
cause of action that no longer depends upon the risk of customer deception. The FTDA protects famous, distinctive marks against com112 See McCarthy, supra note 42, § 3.2.
113 See S. Rep. No. 79-1333 (1946), reprinted in 1946 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1274, 1275 (discussing
the purposes of the Lanham Act). “A trade-mark only gives the right to prohibit the use of
it so far as to protect the owner’s good will against the sale of another’s product as his.” Id.
(quoting Prestonettes v. Coty, 264 U.S. 359, 368 (1924)).
114 See In re Ferrero, 479 F.2d 1395, 1397 (C.C.P.A. 1973) (“The very fact that one mark
may bring another mark to mind does not itself establish likelihood of confusion as to
[the] source [of the product].”).
115 See Am. Home Prods. Corp. v. Barr Labs., Inc., 656 F. Supp. 1058, 1068 (D.N.J.),
aff’d, 834 F.2d 368 (3d Cir. 1987). In American Home Products, the district court held that a
generic pharmaceutical seller did not infringe the Advil trade dress by selling pills with a
similar brown color. See id. at 1068–69. The court pointed out that trade dress that evokes,
but does not confuse, can serve a valuable function:
The resemblance between two products can alert consumers to the functional
or utilitarian equivalence between them, to the fact that one product may be
substituted for the other in the ultimate uses for which the products are intended. The free ºow of information regarding the substitutability of products is valuable to individual consumers and to society collectively, and by
providing it a supplier engages in fair competition based on those aspects—
for example, price—in which the products differ.
Id. at 1068. The court further noted: “The fact that one mark may bring another mark to
mind does not in itself establish likelihood of confusion as to source.” Id. at 1070; see also
Conopco, Inc. v. May Dept. Stores Co., 46 F.3d 1556, 1565 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (ªnding no
infringement when private label retailer “packages its product in a manner to make it clear
to the consumer that the product is similar to the national brand, and is intended for the
same purposes”).
116 See 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2000) (“The term ‘dilution’ means the lessening of the capacity of a famous mark to identify and distinguish goods or services, regardless of the presence or absence of—(1) competition between the owner of the famous mark and other
parties, or (2) likelihood of confusion, mistake, or deception.”).
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mercial uses of other marks that “lessen[]” the famous mark’s capacity
“to identify and distinguish goods or services, regardless of the presence or absence” of competition among the parties or any confusion
as to source.117 The House report offered several examples of uses
that could, over time, reduce a mark’s uniqueness—”the use of DUPONT shoes, BUICK aspirin, and KODAK pianos would be actionable
under this legislation.”118
In the eight years since the FTDA’s passage, the courts of appeals
have had differing views on everything from the degree of distinctiveness required for dilution protection119 to the requisite level of
fame120 to the question of whether the statute applies to claims be117 Id. § 1125(c).
118 H.R. Rep. No. 104-374, at 3 (1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1029, 1030.
119 The federal courts of appeals are divided as to whether inherent distinctiveness is a
separate requirement of the FTDA. Compare TCPIP Holding Co., Inc. v. Haar Communications, Inc., 244 F.3d 88, 98 (2d Cir. 2001) (“weak, non-distinctive, descriptive marks do not
qualify for the [FTDA]’s protection, even if famous”), and Nabisco, Inc. v. PF Brands, Inc.,
191 F.3d 208, 216 (2d Cir. 1999) (“It is quite clear that the statute intends distinctiveness,
in addition to fame as an essential element.”), with Times Mirror Magazines, Inc. v. Las
Vegas Sports News, L.L.C., 212 F.3d 157, 166–67 (3d Cir. 2000) (“we are not persuaded that
a mark be subject to separate tests for fame and distinctiveness”). Interestingly, Nabisco
would have to be decided differently if the Second Circuit applied its own stated legal
standards after the United States Supreme Court, in Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Bros.,
Inc. ruled that product design cannot be inherently distinctive. 529 U.S. 205, 215–16
(2000); see also Deere & Co. v. MTD Prods., Inc., No. 00 CIV. 5936(LMM), 2002 WL
1837402, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 12, 2002) (ªnding no protection under the FTDA because
“use of color alone cannot be inherently distinctive.”) (citing Wal-Mart, 529 U.S. at 211;
Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159, 162–63 (1995); TCPIP, 244 F.3d at 98)).
See generally Toro Co. v. ToroHead, Inc., Opposition No. 114,061, 2001 WL 1734485, at *14
(Trademark Trial & Appeal Bd. Dec. 12, 2001) (“To be vulnerable to dilution, a mark must
be not only famous, but also so distinctive that the public would associate the term with the
owner of the famous mark even when it encounters the term apart from the owner’s goods
or services, i.e., devoid of its trademark context.”).
120 Compare TCPIP, 244 F.3d at 99 (suggesting that plaintiff must show some evidence
of public recognition—consumer surveys, press accounts, or other evidence that its advertising was effective and stating that “we think Congress envisioned that marks would qualify
as ‘famous’ only if they carried a substantial degree of fame”), and I.P. Lund Trading ApS
& Kroin, Inc. v. Kohler Co., 163 F.3d 27, 47 (1st Cir. 1998) (“the standard for fame . . . required to obtain anti-dilution protection is more rigorous than that required to seek infringement protection”), with Advantage Rent-A-Car, Inc. v. Enter. Rent-A-Car, Inc., 238
F.3d 378, 380 (5th Cir. 2001) (party need not show that fame extends beyond its market
when both parties are operating in same market). I.P. Lund involved product design, and it
quoted a provision in the Restatement that suggests an exacting standard for fame in product design context: “A mark that evokes an association with a speciªc source only when
used in connection with the particular goods or services that it identiªes is ordinarily not
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tween competitors.121 The courts of appeals have not yet resolved
whether the statute protects trade dress,122 and despite a recent
United States Supreme Court decision, the standard for proving dilution remains elusive.123 Any resolution of the scope of protection
against dilution thus appears quite a ways off.
Nonetheless, at least in some early interpretations, the FTDA appeared to give trademark holders a broad right to obtain an injunction merely by showing that someone else’s mark brought their mark
to mind.124 A number of appellate decisions suggested that any symbol
that reminded the public of a trademark posed a threat to that mark’s
distinctiveness.125 The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit,
for example, stated that to dilute, a mark “must be of sufªcient similarity so that, in the mind of the consumer, the junior mark will conjure
an association with the senior.”126 Although the court considered other
sufªciently distinctive to be protected against dilution.” See I.P. Lund. 163 F.3d at 46–47
(quoting Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition § 25 cmt. e (1995)). Generally,
the courts seem to view fame in a niche market as sufªcient if both parties are operating in
the same niche market. See Advantage Rent-A-Car, 238 F.3d at 380; Times Mirror Magazines,
212 F.3d at 164 (“We are persuaded that a mark not famous to the general public is nevertheless entitled to protection from dilution where both the plaintiff and defendant are
operating in the same or related markets, so long as the plaintiff’s mark possesses a high
degree of fame in its niche market.”); Syndicate Sales, Inc. v. Hampshire Paper Corp., 192
F.3d 633, 640 (7th Cir. 1999) (summarizing authorities).
121 See, e.g., YKK Corp. v. Jungwoo Zipper Co., 213 F. Supp. 2d 1195, 1207–08 (C.D. Cal.
2002).
122 See Syndicate Sales, 192 F.3d at 639 (ªnding not “insubstantial” the argument that dilution protection for trade dress would be unconstitutional, but refusing to consider challenge that was not raised before the trial court); I.P. Lund, 163 F.3d at 45 (assuming that
statute applies to trade dress, but suggesting that dilution will be rare in product conªguration cases that do not also involve confusion); Armament Sys. & Procedures, Inc. v. Lansky, No. 00 C 6317, 2002 WL 726801, at *2–4 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 24, 2002) (refusing to grant
summary judgment against dilution claim based on use of trade dress consisting of “distinctive black frame housing with ºat side colored panels, its push button activator, its blue
LED light and its retention clip,” though noting that “it is not at all clear” that the plaintiff
will succeed in proving fame and other elements of dilution claim).
123 See Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, Inc., 123 S. Ct. 1115, 1123–25 (2003).
124 See V Secret Catalogue v. Moseley, 259 F.3d 464, 475 (6th Cir. 2001), rev’d, 123 S. Ct.
1115; Nabisco, 191 F.3d at 223–24.
125 See Nabisco, 191 F.3d at 223.
126 See id. at 218 (emphasis added); see also V Secret Catalogue, 259 F.3d at 475 (adopting
Second Circuit “conjure an association” standard), rev’d, 123 S. Ct. 1115; Eli Lilly & Co. v.
Natural Answers, Inc., 233 F.3d 456, 467–69 (7th Cir. 2000) (ªnding “Herbozac” dilutive of
“Prozac” based solely on Prozac’s degree of renown and the similarity between the marks,
based on Second Circuit’s “conjure an association” standard).
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factors in evaluating the evidence of dilution, the focus of the inquiry
remained whether the junior use would “remind” the public of the
senior mark.127 At the other extreme, the U.S. Court of Appeals of the
Fourth Circuit refused to ªnd dilution unless a plaintiff showed an
actual, consummated adverse impact on its mark’s selling power as a
result of the junior use.128
These two divergent interpretations of the dilution standard
reºected radically different conceptions of Congress’s goals in enacting the FTDA. On the one hand, a standard requiring proof of actual,
consummated injury views the dilution statute as targeting only cases
in which loss of selling power has already occurred, and imposes a
virtually insurmountable hurdle of proof: even holders of distinctive,
famous marks would have to wait for evidence of loss of brand recognition before bringing an injunction against use of the same mark by
another party.129 On the other hand, a standard of dilution based
solely on a mark conjuring another reºects a view that a famous mark
has a singular association in people’s minds and is entitled to protection against any background noise that might interfere with the purity
of that association.130 The upshot is that the owner of a famous mark
127 See Nabisco, 191 F.3d at 219. In explaining the relevance of distinctiveness and the
channels of commerce, for example, the court explained:
It is easy to imagine instances where because of the low level of distinctiveness
of the senior mark, or insufªcient similarity between the two, the use of the
junior mark in a remote area of commerce would have little tendency to remind consumers of the senior mark and thus little capacity to dilute its effectiveness,
but where use of the same junior mark in a closely related area would bring
about the harm the statute was designed to avoid.
Id. (emphasis added).
Other courts imposed a more stringent similarity requirement for dilution than for
likelihood of confusion. See, e.g., Jet, Inc. v. Sewage Aeration Sys., 165 F.3d 419, 425 (6th
Cir. 1999) (upholding requirement that marks be “the same or very similar” to support a
dilution claim because “Jet’s theory would permit it to enjoin the use of a vast number of
registered trademarks containing the word ‘jet’ and used in unrelated industries”).
128 Ringling Bros.-Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows, Inc. v. Utah Div. of Travel Dev.,
170 F.3d 449, 453 (4th Cir. 1999); see also Westchester Media v. PRL USA Holdings, Inc.,
214 F.3d 658, 670 (5th Cir. 2000) (adopting the Fourth Circuit’s actual-harm standard).
129 See Nabisco, 191 F.3d at 223–24. Even the classic examples—”DuPont” shoes, “Buick”
aspirin, and “Kodak” pianos—would require proof of actual harm before an injunction
could enter. See H.R. Rep. No. 104-374, at 3 (1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1029,
1030.
130 See Jerre B. Swann, Sr., Dilution Redeªned for the Year 2002, 92 Trademark Rep. 585,
613 (2002). Under this view, the use of words that evoke the mark do not destroy, but
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would have in gross property rights, not only in the mark itself but in
a broad penumbra of associated words.131 The loose dilution standard,
in other words, represents a strong right to evoke.
In contrast to these extreme interpretations of the FTDA, some
courts of appeals adopted a more nuanced view of the FTDA’s objectives. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, for example,
described the overall objective of dilution analysis as protecting not
against attenuated weakening of brand value but against the loss of the
singularity of a famous mark: “Blurring occurs when the defendant’s
use of its mark causes the public to no longer associate the plaintiff’s
famous mark with its goods or services; the public instead begins associating both the plaintiff and the defendant with the famous mark.”132
In this view, a trademark holder—of even a famous mark—is not entitled to absolutely pure, interference-free connections; although
trademark holders may prevent use by others that will eventually
make their marks lose their singularity, the circle should not be drawn
beyond users of the mark itself and others that the public views as the
same.133
weaken the singular mental association between a mark and its owner: “When, therefore,
two brands are associated, there may be a ‘fan effect’: by the process of spreading activation, discrete and (usually) consistent propositions linked to each symbol become part of a
larger, divergent array, with adverse memory consequences for both the brand concepts
and each of their separate links.” Id. Advocates of this position also contend that allowing
parties to evoke others’ brands—along with their positive associations—would unjustly
enrich evokers because blurring and tarnishment are both “examples of the exploitation
of the memorability of a brand.” See id. at 622. Like the related right of publicity, it reºects
a notion that trademark holders should have the right to capture—or, in this case, to enjoin—all of the positive associations related to their intellectual property. See id. at 623–24.
131 Cf. Lunney, supra note 45, at 372 (In the wake of recent expansions in trademark
law, “trademarks become property not merely in the formal, legal sense of a right assigned
to an entity reasonably well-placed to protect and vindicate the mark’s information function, but in the more ordinary, more substantive, and ultimately more absolute sense of a
thing belonging fully and completely to its owner.”).
132 Times Mirror Magazines, 212 F.3d at 168; see also Hasbro, Inc. v. Clue Computing,
Inc., 66 F. Supp. 2d 117, 134 (D. Mass. 1999) (“The basic idea of blurring is that the defendant’s use of the plaintiff’s mark causes the public no longer to think only of plaintiff’s
product upon seeing the famous mark, but rather to associate both the plaintiff and the
defendant with the mark.”); 4 J. Thomas McCarthy, McCarthy on Trademarks and
Unfair Competition § 24:68 (4th ed. 2002).
133 See McCarthy, supra note 132, § 24:90.2. In Professor McCarthy’s view, for dilution
to apply, the marks have to be effectively the same—”the marks must be similar enough
that a signiªcant segment of the target group sees the two marks as essentially the same.”
Id. He describes blurring not as an abstract loss of purity in association between mark and
product, but as one mark seen by customers as now identifying two sources. See id. In an
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The United States Supreme Court, in Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue,
Inc., adopted a version of this intermediate view of the FTDA. Although the Court agreed doctrinally with the Fourth Circuit that the
FTDA requires “actual” rather than “likelihood of” dilution, for practical purposes the decision forged a middle ground between the two
standards.134 In Moseley, the owners of the “Victoria’s Secret” mark
sued a party that adopted “Victor’s Little Secret” as the name of an
adult gift store in Kentucky. The plaintiffs claimed that defendants’
use of “Victor’s Little Secret” both blurred and tarnished the “Victoria’s Secret” mark.135 The Sixth Circuit had ruled in favor of the plaintiffs, ªnding that consumers hearing the name of the gift store were
“likely automatically to think of the more famous store and to link”
the two.136 Finding such linking “a classic instance of dilution by tarnishing (associating the Victoria’s Secret name with sex toys and lewd
coffee mugs) and by blurring (linking the chain with a single, unauthorized establishment),” the Sixth Circuit upheld summary judgment for the plaintiffs.137 In reaching this conclusion, the court rejected the Fourth Circuit’s requirement that plaintiffs prove
consummated loss of selling power to prevail in an FTDA claim.138
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve the circuit split
over the “actual harm” standard.139 Noting that the FTDA applies to
uses that “‘cause[] dilution of the distinctive quality’ of the famous
mark,” the Court held that the statute “unambiguously requires a
showing of actual dilution, rather than a likelihood of dilution.”140 A
plaintiff, in other words, must show that a defendant’s use in fact diattempt to reºect this view, the district court in Hasbro required a trademark holder to
prove “that consumers associate the two different products with the mark even if they are
not confused as to the different origins of these products.” 66 F. Supp. 2d at 136. The Second Circuit has also recently shown some interest in this approach. See Hormel Foods
Corp. v. Jim Henson Prod., Inc., 73 F.3d 497, 506 (2d Cir. 1996) (noting that dilution by
blurring occurs when consumers “‘see the plaintiff’s mark used on a plethora of different
goods and services . . . raising the possibility that the mark will lose its ability to serve as a
unique identiªer of the plaintiff’s product.’” (quoting Deere & Co., 41 F.3d at 43)).
134 See 123 S. Ct. at 1124.
135 Id. at 1119.
136 V Secret Catalogue, 259 F.3d 464, 477 (2001), rev’d, 123 S. Ct. 1115.
137 Id.
138 See id. at 466.
139 Moseley, 123 S. Ct. at 1121–22.
140 Id. at 1124.
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lutes its mark, rather than merely that some future dilution is likely.141
Although the Court offered little guidance on how one might prove
“actual dilution,” it made clear that “the mere fact that consumers
mentally associate the junior user’s mark with a famous mark is not
sufªcient.”142 According to the Court, “[S]uch mental association will
not necessarily reduce the capacity of the famous mark to identify the
goods of its owner, the statutory requirement for dilution under the
FTDA.”143
While nominally adopting an actual dilution standard, however,
the Court liberally constructed the meaning of “actual dilution.”144
The Court not only rejected the Fourth Circuit’s requirement that
parties prove loss of sales or proªts, it also suggested that dilution did
not depend on survey or other evidence of the actual effect of a challenged use in the marketplace.145 Instead, the Court indicated that
“actual dilution can reliably be proven through circumstantial evidence—the obvious case is one where the junior and senior marks are
identical.”146
By suggesting that circumstantial evidence can be used to prove
actual dilution—and by speciªcally stating that surveys proving loss of
distinctiveness are unnecessary—the Court fell short of requiring
proof of consummated dilution.147 In other words, if a plaintiff need
not introduce evidence that a famous mark has suffered an actual loss
of distinctiveness in consumers’ minds, or a loss of value associated
with such loss of distinctiveness, then the plaintiff can prevail in a
FTDA claim without direct proof of actual dilution.148 On the other
hand, the plaintiff must show that the challenged use, either by its

141 See id.
142 Id.
143 Id. At the same time, the Court appeared to reject the Fourth Circuit’s strict “consummated injury” standard: “Of course, [requiring actual dilution] does not mean that the
consequences of dilution, such as an actual loss of sales or proªts, must also be proved.” Id.
144 See Moseley, 123 S. Ct. at 1124.
145 See id. (stating that the actual dilution requirement “does not mean that the consequences of dilution, such as an actual loss of sales or proªts, must also be proved,” and
disagreeing with the Fourth Circuit’s contrary suggestion).
146 Id. at 1125.
147 See id. at 1124–25.
148 See id.
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nature or through its actual effect, causes a loss of the famous mark’s
singularity.149
Thus, under the Court’s suggested approach, proof of dilution
requires either that a defendant’s use by its very nature reduces the singularity of the famous mark (as when the defendant uses an identical
mark) or that a defendant’s use actually reduces the singularity of the
famous mark (by, for example, reducing its selling power, as proven
through surveys or direct ªnancial evidence).150 The Court in Moseley
has therefore left the FTDA intact, but deliberately rejected a strong
right to evoke.
II. The Public’s Interest in Evocation
The above analysis explores some of the ways in which the law
empowers people to prevent others from evoking their protected intellectual property. Assuming the case has been made, however, why
should we care?
A rich body of scholarship points out many of the positive reasons that speakers need an ability to evoke cultural associations to
make effective speech. Rochelle Dreyfuss, for example, has made a
strong case for using trademarks themselves to evoke particular images,151 and even the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit recently held that it was fair game to make fun of Barbie.152 Numerous
scholars—and many courts—have emphasized the importance of a
rich public domain ªlled with the tools for future authorship.153 Our
culture would suffer if we were prevented not only from using these
images, but from reminding people of them.

149 See Moseley, 123 S. Ct. at 1124–25.
150 See id.
151 See generally Dreyfuss, supra note 45, at 397.
152 See Mattel, Inc. v. MCA Records, Inc., 296 F.3d 894 (9th Cir. 2002), cert. denied, No.
02-633, 2003 WL 167680 (U.S. Jan. 27, 2003).
153 See Gordon, supra note 64, at 1563–64 (1993) (contending that “creators should
have property in their original works, only provided that such grant of property does no
harm to other persons’ equal abilities to create or to draw upon the preexisting cultural
matrix and scientiªc heritage”); Jessica Litman, The Public Domain, 39 Emory L.J. 965, 968
(1990) (“The public domain should be understood not as the realm of material that is
undeserving of protection, but as a device that permits the rest of the system to work by
leaving the raw material of authorship available for authors to use.”).
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There are other good reasons to avoid an abstract right to evoke,
even if we accept existing limitations on the public’s right to use identiªable, tangible features of existing intellectual property. First, as
rights extend from the tangible to the ethereal, speakers will have a
more difªcult time evaluating whether their contemplated speech
violates someone’s rights. The resulting uncertainty will undoubtedly
chill speech.154 Second, as the scope of rights increases beyond features identiªed solely with the intellectual property at issue, we run
the risk of generating conºicting claims among multiple stakeholders.155 We are already experiencing a conºict of interests between
copyright holders and actors who play roles in their copyrighted
works.156 Those conºicts could potentially multiply if certain words,
marks, or symbols remind the public of multiple parties. Finally, particularly in the trademark realm, the public frequently beneªts when
a new market entrant uses product trade dress to evoke the strong
trade dress of an entrenched market participant.157 So long as there is
154 See Netanel, supra note 44, at 19 (“At the very least, the idea/expression dichotomy’s very vagueness induces considerable speaker self-censorship.”).
155 See White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., 989 F.2d 1512, 1517 (9th Cir. 1993) (Kozinski, J., dissenting) (denial of rehearing en banc).
156 See Wendt v. Host Int’l, Inc., 125 F.3d 806, 809 (9th Cir. 1997). In Wendt, for example, the producers of Cheers had authorized the replica bars with all their related paraphernalia. See id. at 811. When the actors brought a right of publicity claim, the licensee
defended on the ground that its license authorized use of the characters and that, because
its right to the material sounded in copyright, it preempted the actors’ state right of publicity claim. See id. Like most courts considering such conºicts, however, the Ninth Circuit
held the claims not preempted. See id. at 809; see also Landham v. Lewis Galoob Toys, Inc.,
227 F.3d 619, 624–25 (6th Cir. 2000).
157 See Am. Home Prods. Corp. v. Barr Labs., Inc., 834 F.2d 368, 371 (3d Cir. 1987) (“A
response that one ‘associates’ a given product with the name of a competitive product may
simply reºect the recognition that the two products are competitive and serve the same
purpose.”); Fla. Breckenridge, Inc. v. Solvay, No. 97-8417-Civ-RYSKAMP, 1997 WL 695413,
at *9 (S.D. Fla. July 18, 1997) (difference in shape of generic pill would adequately distinguish it from brand-name product in a consumer’s mind, and “given the similarity in colors, she would probably know that she had been given the generic version … and not the
wrong prescription altogether”); Hutchinson v. Essence Communications, Inc., 769 F.
Supp. 541, 556 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (holding that the fact that a defendant’s use of a mark
makes consumers “think about” plaintiff’s product “is not compelling evidence of actual
confusion”); cf. In re Ferrero, 479 F.2d 1395, 1397 (C.C.P.A. 1973) (“The very fact of calling
to mind may indicate that the mind is distinguishing, rather than being confused by, two
marks.”). But see McNeil-PPC, Inc. v. Granutec, Inc., 919 F. Supp. 198, 203 (E.D.N.C. 1995)
(distinguishing American Home and ªnding likelihood of success in trademark claim by
Tylenol, when “shape and texture as well as the color of [defendant’s] product is remarkably similar to the Tylenol gelcap”).
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no confusion, however, the evocation serves an important public policy goal of market competition. With dilution protection for trade
dress, some of this desirable activity might subside.158
In contrast with its negative effect on public discourse, an unencumbered right to evoke may not promote the core philosophical objectives of trademark or right of publicity laws. Take the right of publicity: under a utilitarian theory, celebrities should have an incentive
to develop personae pleasing to the public.159 As scholars have
pointed out, however, celebrities arguably have such an incentive
anyway, without any right of publicity.160 In any event, it is at best questionable whether a right to proªt from evocations would add measurably to whatever incentive the right of publicity already provides.
The other theoretical justiªcations for the right—natural rights theory and unjust enrichment—should involve some consciousness of
whether the alleged violator has taken something of value that the
celebrity was responsible for creating. In many (though not all) cases,
others are primarily responsible for the value of symbols or other reference points that happen to evoke celebrities.161 In light of these
competing concerns, as well as the speech interests of the public outlined above, courts considering publicity claims based on mere evoca-

158 Theoretically, the FTDA might protect this kind of behavior as comparative advertising, but it does not ªt neatly within the comparative advertising mold. See 15 U.S.C.
§ 1125(c)(4) (2000) (allowing “[f]air use of a famous mark by another person in comparative commercial advertising or promotion to identify the competing goods or services of
the owner of the famous mark”).
159 See Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 433 U.S. 562, 576 (1977) (right of publicity “provides an economic incentive for [performers] to make the investment required
to produce a performance of interest to the public”).
160 See Madow, supra note 46, at 203–04 (“Even in a world without publicity rights, celebrities would still be able to derive substantial income from their publicity values, to say
nothing of the income they would continue to derive from the activities to which they owe
their fame.”); Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, We Are Symbols and Inhabit Symbols, So Why Should
We Be Paying Rent?, 20 Colum.-VLA J.L. & Arts 123, 144–45 (1996) (“[T]he right of publicity does not ªt the utilitarian mold because the cost of creating a persona are recaptured
through the activity with which the purveyor is primarily associated . . . . Furthermore, the
marginal increase in incentives that this right provides is not likely to produce any
signiªcant increase in the amount of creative material produced.”).
161 See White, 989 F.2d at 1517 (Kozinski, J., dissenting) (denial of rehearing en banc).
In the context of most television programs, for example, the shows’ creators have arguably
had more of a hand in building the value of the set and other features that might be argued to evoke one of the characters. See id.; Dreyfuss, supra note 160, at 144–45.
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tion should at least engage in some balancing to determine whether
the right of publicity should prevail in a particular case.162
Similar considerations apply to dilution. To the extent that dilution law seeks to prevent junior users from commandeering famous
marks such that consumers no longer can identify their source,163 that
problem can be adequately addressed by applying dilution law only
against marks that are identical or legally equivalent to a famous
mark.164 The FTDA, after all, was intended to protect not only owners
of famous trademarks, but also the public.165 Extending dilution
rights to all marks bearing any associational relationship to famous
ones exceeds the narrow objectives of the statute, at a signiªcant societal cost. To be sure, such an interpretation arguably protects the
purity of the famous mark’s recall with consumers; but the existence
and exclusivity of the recall is not threatened. In comparison with the
public interests outlined above, the added value of a right to evoke
seems insigniªcant.
III. Some Proposals
Constraining the right to evoke requires neither legislative action
nor radical judicial re-interpretation of existing law. To the contrary,
as in the copyright context, courts could easily cabin the expansion of
an evocation right merely by giving force to the limits inherent in
trademark and right of publicity doctrines. The following are some
possible vehicles to move in that direction.
Two generalities apply to both trademark and right of publicity
cases. First, courts should resist the temptation to equate evocation
162 See Cardtoons, L.C. v. Major League Baseball Players Ass’n, 95 F.3d 959, 969–76
(10th Cir. 1996) (balancing of free speech interests with intellectual property rights in case
involving appropriation of name and likeness of major league baseball players); see also
Comedy III Prods., Inc. v. Gary Saderup, Inc., 21 P.3d 797, 810 (Cal. 2001), cert. denied, 534
U.S. 1078 (2002) (suggesting that a First Amendment defense may protect against a right
of publicity claim when defendant has introduced “signiªcant transformative elements” or
when “the value of the work does not derive primarily from the celebrity’s fame”).
163 H.R. Rep. No. 104-374, at 3 (1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1029, 1030 (listing “DuPont” shoes, “Buick” aspirin, and “Kodak” pianos as examples of dilutive uses of
famous marks).
164 Cf. Moseley, 123 S. Ct. at 1124 (“at least where the marks are not identical, the mere fact
that consumers mentally associate the junior’s mark with a famous mark is not sufªcient to
establish actionable dilution”).
165 See H.R. Rep. No. 104-374, at 4 (1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1029, 1031.
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with infringement, absent some rationale to do so in a particular
case.166 Second, even if such a rationale exists in a particular case,
courts should not accept it blindly, but should consider whether the
public’s interest in evocation outweighs the intellectual property
holder’s concern in that case.
My speciªc doctrinal suggestions are somewhat more guarded.
Courts might consider, in right of publicity cases, limiting an evocation right to cases involving likelihood of confusion as to endorsement. In other words, if a commercial actor does not use a name or
likeness but merely evokes a celebrity’s identity, the publicity right
should apply only if the public is likely to believe that the celebrity
endorsed the advertisement or product at issue.
In the dilution context, Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, Inc.167 has arguably begun a move away from a right to evoke, but more remains to
be done. For one thing, Moseley only applies to the FTDA, and many
state dilution laws have been invoked in cases involving mere evocation.168 Even in federal cases, however, Moseley’s lack of clarity leaves
some open questions. For one, the meaning of “dilution” remains unclear. In light of the legislative history of the FTDA, it appears that
courts should seek to distinguish between diluting loss of singularity,
on the one hand, and mere background noise, on the other.169 By articulating dilution’s objective as the preservation of singularity of famous marks, courts would not only avoid unjustiªed intrusions into
the public domain, but would arguably limit dilution claims to those
that Congress appears to have contemplated in passing the FTDA.170
One effect of this approach might be to require near identity between
marks before allowing a dilution claim. In cases involving nonidentical marks, Moseley appropriately suggests a need for proof of actual, consummated dilution because of the risk of unduly restricting
the public domain under any approach that allows a presumption of
actual dilution.171 Even with identical marks, this approach would
166 See Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, Inc., 123 S. Ct. 1115, 1124–25 (2003).
167 Id.
168 See, e.g., Deere & Co. v. MTD Prods., Inc., No. 94 CIV. 2322(DLC), 1995 WL 81299,
at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 28, 1995).
169 See H.R. Rep. No. 104-374, at 3 (1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1029, 1030.
170 See id. at 4.
171 See Moseley, 123 S. Ct. at 1123–24.
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counsel in favor of a broad version of the “nominative fair use” doctrine, to make clear that uses referring to the trademark holder itself do
not reduce the singularity of the mark because they reinforce, rather
than weaken, association between a mark and its source.172
Beyond clarifying the objective of the dilution inquiry, courts
should be mindful of the positive reasons for allowing parties to evoke
others’ products or services in pro-competitive ways. They might also
weigh the public’s interest in such evocation in certain cases or with
respect to certain types of marks. With trade dress, for example, it
seems likely that the positive beneªts of evocation outweigh the interest in protecting against dilution.173 For that reason, courts should not
presume that Congress intended to extend dilution protection to
trade dress.
Conclusion
We should be concerned about the trend toward allowing intellectual property holders to prevent others from using non-proprietary
words, expression, or symbols to evoke their intellectual property.
This Article identiªes the trend and suggests some of the reasons for
concern. It establishes that a right to evoke is not a notion limited to a
rogue opinion of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit or to
right of publicity law. If we wish to preserve a rich commons and avoid
signiªcantly chilling free expression, courts should at least cabin the
right to evoke and ensure that, when utilized, it serves the law’s normative goals.

172 See, e.g., EMI Catalogue P’ship v. Hill, Holliday, Connors, Cosmopulos Inc., 228 F.3d
56, 64 (2d Cir. 2000) (“The fair use doctrine permits use of a protected mark by others to
describe certain aspects of the user’s own goods.”); United States Shoe Corp. v. Brown
Group, Inc., 740 F. Supp. 196, 199–200 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (fair use doctrine protects use of
words “in good faith for descriptive purposes pertinent to their products,” even when use
might remind the public of a protected trademark).
173 Trademark holders who suffered from confusing use of trade dress, of course,
would have a traditional likelihood of confusion claim. See 15 U.S.C § 1125(a) (2000).

